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ABSTRACT
Publishing person-specific transactions in an anonymous
form is increasingly required by organizations. Recent
approaches ensure that potentially identifying information
(e.g., a set of diagnosis codes) cannot be used to link pub-
lished transactions to persons’ identities, but all are lim-
ited in application because they incorporate coarse privacy
requirements (e.g., protecting a certain set of m diagnosis
codes requires protecting all m-sized sets), do not integrate
utility requirements, and tend to explore a small portion
of the solution space. In this paper, we propose a more
general framework for anonymizing transactional data un-
der specific privacy and utility requirements. We model
such requirements as constraints, investigate how these con-
straints can be specified, and propose COAT (COnstraint-
based Anonymization of Transactions), an algorithm that
anonymizes transactions using a flexible hierarchy-free gen-
eralization scheme to meet the specified constraints. Exper-
iments with benchmark datasets verify that COAT signifi-
cantly outperforms the current state-of-the-art algorithm in
terms of data utility, while being comparable in terms of
efficiency. The effectiveness of our approach is also demon-
strated in a real-world scenario, which requires disseminat-
ing a private, patient-specific transactional dataset in a way
that preserves both privacy and utility in intended studies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Organizations in various domains, ranging from health-
care to government, increasingly share person-specific data,
devoid of explicit identifiers (e.g., names), to enable research
and comply with regulations. For instance, the U.S. Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) recently mandated that
NIH-sponsored investigators disclose data collected or stud-
ied in a manner that is “free of identifiers that could lead to
deductive disclosure of the identity of individual subjects”
[?]. Numerous studies demonstrate that de-identification
(i.e., the removal of explicit identifiers) is insufficient for
privacy protection of transactional data (i.e., data in which
a set of items correspond to an individual) [13] 25 [10]. This
is because published transactions can disclose the identity
of an individual associated with a transaction, if an attacker
knows some of the items this individual is associated with.
Imagine for example that Alice was diagnosed with the dis-
eases contained in the first transaction of Fig. 1(a) and told
her neighbor Bob that she suffers from a, b and c, which
are relatively common. Publishing a de-identified version
of the data of Fig. 1(a) allows Bob to find out that the
first transaction corresponds to Alice, since there is only one
transaction containing a, b and c in this dataset. This prob-
lem, referred to as identity disclosure, must be addressed to
comply with regulations and to protect individuals’ privacy.
Having identified Alice’s transaction, for example, Bob can
infer that Alice also suffers from the diseases d, e, f, g and h.
1.1 Motivation
To prevent identity disclosure, portions of transactions
that are potentially linkable to identifying information need
to be explicitly specified and protected prior to data release.
This involves formulating a set of privacy constraints, which
are satisfied by transforming data so that each individual
is linked to a sufficiently large number of transactions with
respect to these constraints. This process achieves privacy
because an attacker must distinguish an individual’s real
transaction among the transformed ones to identify him/her.
However, data transformation may harm data utility when
usability requirements are unaccounted for, resulting in re-
leased data that is subpar for intended applications. Thus,
it is essential to balance privacy constraints with utility con-
straints to ensure meaningful analysis. To show the impor-
tance of both types of constraints consider Example 1.
Patient Diagnosis Codes
Alice a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h
Mary a, c, e, f, g
George c, d, e, f, h
Jack a, c, e, f
Anne e, f, g, h
Tom d, e, f, g
Jim a, b, d, e
Steve a, c, f
David a, c
Ellen b, h
(a) Original dataset
p1={a,b,c}
p2={d,e,f,g,h}
(b) Privacy Constraints
u1={a,b}
u2={c}
u3={d}
u4={e,f,g,h}
(c) Utility Constraints
Figure 1: Example dataset and constraints.
Example 1. Imagine that a hospital needs to publish the
dataset of Fig. 1(a), where each transaction corresponds to
Patient Diagnosis Codes
Alice (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
Mary (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
George (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
Jack (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
Anne (d, e, f, g, h)
Tom (d, e, f, g, h)
Jim (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
Steve (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
David (a, b, c)
Ellen (a, b, c), (d, e, f, g, h)
(a) Apriori (55-anonymity) [20]
Patient Diagnosis Codes
Alice e, f
Mary e, f
George e, f
Jack e, f
Anne e, f
Tom e, f
Jim e
Steve f
David -
Ellen -
(b) Greedy Algorithm
((1, 5, 5)-coherence) [5]
Patient Diagnosis Codes
Alice (a, b), c, e, f, (g, h)
Mary (a, b), c, e, f, (g, h)
George c, e, f, (g, h)
Jack (a, b), c, e, f
Anne e, f, (g, h)
Tom e, f, (g, h)
Jim (a, b), e
Steve (a, b), c, f
David (a, b), c
Ellen (a, b), (g, h)
(c) COAT (k = 5, s = 15%, con-
straints of Figs. 1(b) and 1(c))
Figure 2: Three possible anonymizations of the dataset of Fig. 1(a).
a patient (patients’ names are not released) and consists of
a set of diagnosis codes (items). Certain item combinations
(itemsets), such as the combinations of diagnosis codes abc
and defgh of Fig. 1(b), are regarded as potentially link-
able and must be associated with at least 5 transactions to
prevent identity disclosure. At the same time, the published
data must be able to support a study in which the number
of patients diagnosed with cold, denoted with c, needs to be
accurately determined. These requirements can be modeled
via the privacy constraints in Fig. 1(b) and a utility con-
straint {c}. An anonymization that satisfies them is given
in Fig. 2(c). Observe that each patient can be linked to
no less than 5 transactions using the combinations abc or
defgh, while the number of patients suffering from cold can
still be accurately computed after anonymization.
1.2 Limitations of Existing Methodologies
Preventing identity disclosure in transactional data was
investigated recently [20, 25]; however, existing approaches
inadequately deal with the scenario of Example 1 for sev-
eral reasons. First, they support a limited class of privacy
requirements. While they are effective at protecting all item-
sets comprised of a certain number of items (i.e., itemsets
of certain size), potentially linkable itemsets may involve
certain items only and vary in size. For instance, in the
presence of the privacy constraints in Example 1, the ap-
proaches of [20] and [25] would protect all 56 combinations
of 5 diagnosis codes (e.g., abcde, bcdef , etc.). Unnecessarily
protecting itemsets significantly distorts data because the
number of itemsets that require protection rapidly increases
with their size.
Second, prior approaches neglect specific data utility re-
quirements. Thus, they do not guarantee generating prac-
tically useful solutions for environments where usability
is based on well-defined policies, such as in epidemiology
(where combinations of diagnosis codes form syndromes)
[12]. For instance, when applied to the dataset of Fig.
1(a), [20] and [25] produce the anonymizations of Figs. 2(a)
and 2(b) (respectively). These anonymizations do not sup-
port the study of Example 1 because they do not allow the
number of patients suffering from cold to be accurately com-
puted, as a result of violating the utility constraint {c}.
Third, the existing literature considers only a small num-
ber of possible transformations to meet privacy constraints.
For example, [20] protects a, b and c by generalizing them
to their closest common ascendant (a, b, c) according to the
hierarchy of Fig. 3, while [25] does so by eliminating them
from the released dataset. This incurs excessive information
loss, but, as we show in this paper, is unnecessary because
items can be generalized together in a hierarchy-free manner
to reduce the amount of information loss incurred.
Figure 3: Hierarchy for the dataset of Fig. 1(a).
1.3 Contributions
This paper proposes an innovative approach to anonymize
transactional data under privacy and utility constraints.
Given a dataset and a set of constraints, our approach pre-
vents identity disclosure by ensuring that each transaction is
indistinguishable from at least k−1 other transactions with
respect to privacy constraints, while satisfying utility con-
straints. For instance, when applied to anonymize the data
in Fig. 1(a) using the constraints in Figs. 1(b) and 1(c), our
approach generates the anonymization of Fig. 2(c), which
satisfies the imposed constraints.
Our work makes the following specific contributions:
First, we propose a novel constraint specification model that
enables data owners to express detailed privacy and utility
requirements. We introduce privacy constraints that allow
protecting the required itemsets only, thereby reducing in-
formation loss, and utility constraints that ensure the utility
of anonymized data in practice. Acknowledging that con-
straint specification may be difficult in lack of specific do-
main knowledge, we also propose an algorithm to extract
privacy constraints from the data and a recipe for specify-
ing utility constraints.
Second, we propose an item generalization model that
eliminates the requirement for hierarchies. This is impor-
tant because many domains do not fit into rigid hierarchies
[6,15]. In doing so, our framework can produce fine-grained
anonymizations with substantially better utility than that
of [20] and [25]. For example, to meet the privacy constraint
p1 (Fig. 1(b)), our solution generalizes a and b to (a, b) and
leaves c intact, retaining more information than [20], which
releases (a, b, c), and [25], which eliminates a, b and c.
Third, we develop COnstraint-based Anonymization of
Transactions (COAT), an algorithm that iteratively selects
privacy constraints and transforms data to satisfy them. For
each privacy constraint, COAT generalizes items in accor-
dance with the specified utility constraints and attempts to
minimize information loss. When a privacy constraint can-
not be satisfied through generalization, COAT suppresses
the least number of items required to meet this constraint.
Fourth, we investigate the effectiveness of our approach
through experiments on widely-used benchmark datasets
and a case study on patient-specific data extracted from the
Electronic Medical Record system [18] of Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Medical Center, a large healthcare provider in the U.S.
Our results verify that the proposed methodology is able
to anonymize transactions under various privacy and utility
constraints with less information loss than the state-of-the-
art method [20] and to generate high-quality anonymizations
in a real-world data dissemination scenario.
1.4 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work
is reviewed in Section 2. We formally define our constraint
specification model and the problem of anonymizing trans-
actions under constraints in Section 3. COAT is presented
in Section 4. Section 5 presents methods for specifiying con-
straints. Sections 6 and 7 report experimental results and
a case study of applying COAT respectively. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
The problem of identity disclosure in relational data pub-
lishing has been studied extensively [4, 8, 9, 16, 19]. A well-
established principle that can prevent this type of threat
is k-anonymity [16, 19]. A relational table is k-anonymous
when each record is indistinguishable from at least k−1 oth-
ers with respect to potentially identifying attributes (termed
quasi-identifiers or QIDs). K-anonymity can be achieved by
generalization, a process in which QID values are replaced
by more general ones specified by a generalization (recod-
ing) model, or via suppression, a technique that removes
values or records from anonymized data [8]. In this work,
we anonymize transactions to thwart identity disclosure by
applying item generalization and suppression. Beyond iden-
tity disclosure is another threat in relational data publishing
known as attribute disclosure (i.e., the inference of an indi-
vidual’s sensitive values), which can be guarded against by
several principles, such as l-diversity [11]. We note that our
approach can be extended to prevent attribute disclosure as
well, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Privacy-preserving publication of transactions was re-
cently investigated [5, 20, 25]. First, in [20], km-anonymity
was proposed to prevent attackers with the knowledge of at
most m items from linking an identified individual to less
than k published transactions. The authors of [20] designed
three algorithms to enforce km-anonymity, but the Apri-
ori algorithm is the only one that is sufficiently scalable for
use in practice. It operates in a bottom-up fashion, begin-
ning with itemsets comprised of one item and subsequently
considers incrementally larger itemsets. In each iteration,
km-anonymity is enforced using a hierarchy-based general-
ization model. Second, [25] proposed (h, k, p)-coherence, a
privacy principle that addresses both identity and attribute
disclosure. This principle assumes a fixed classification of
items into potentially linkable and sensitive, treats poten-
tially linkable items similarly to km-anonymity, and addi-
tionally limits the probability of inferring sensitive items.
Following [20], we do not adopt such a classification, and al-
low any item to be treated as potentially linkable for the re-
maining (sensitive) items. To satisfy (h, k, p)-coherence, [25]
proposed an algorithm that discovers all unprotected item-
sets of minimal size and protects them by iteratively sup-
pressing the item contained in the greatest number of those
itemsets. The primary differences between our work and
the approaches of [20] and [25] were discussed in the Intro-
duction. Finally, [5] developed a method that eliminates at-
tribute disclosure based on bucketization [23] and l-diversity.
Our work is orthogonal to [5]; we do not aim to thwart at-
tribute disclosure, but rather apply item generalization and
suppression to guard against identity disclosure.
Preserving privacy has also been considered in contexts
related to knowledge sharing, where the goal is to prevent
the inference of rules or patterns [2, 21]. Our method is
fundamentally different from this line of research, as we aim
to publish data that prevents the disclosure of individuals’
identities instead.
3. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM FOR-
MULATION
Let I = {i1, ..., iM} be a finite set of literals, called items.
Any subset I ⊆ I is called an itemset over I, and is rep-
resented as the concatenation of the items it contains. An
itemset that hasm items or equivalently a size ofm, is called
an m-itemset. A dataset D = {T1, ..., TN} is a set of N
transactions. Each transaction Tn, n = 1, ..., N , over I cor-
responds to a unique individual and is a pair Tn = (tid , I),
where I is the itemset and tid is a unique identifier. A trans-
action Tn = (tid , J) supports an itemset I over I, if I ⊆ J .
Given an itemset I over I in D, we use sup(I,D) to rep-
resent the number of transactions Tn ∈ D that support I .
This set of transactions, called supporting transactions of I
in D, is denoted as DI .
3.1 Set-based Anonymization
We propose a set-based anonymization model for transac-
tional data, formally defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. (Set-Based Anonymization). A set-
based anonymization of I is a set I˜ = {i˜1, ..., i˜M˜} with the
following properties: (1) each item in I is mapped to a
unique item ˜im ∈ I˜, m ∈ [1, M˜ ], that is a subset of I, using
an anonymization function Φ : I → I˜, (2)
⋃M˜
m=1
˜im = I−S,
where S is the set of items mapped to the empty subset of I,
and (3) i˜r ∩ i˜s = ∅, for any i˜r, i˜s ∈ I˜, r 6= s.
i˜ is a generalized item when it contains at least one ir ∈ I
that is mapped to a non-empty subset of I. We use the
notation i˜ = (i1, . . . , im) to refer to its elements (items) from
I. Any item from I that is mapped to the empty subset of
I, denoted as ( ), is called suppressed, and is contained in the
set S . An example of a set-based anonymization is shown in
Fig. 4. Notice that items a and b are mapped to the same
generalized item (a, b), whereas item d is suppressed.
The set-based anonymization model is very flexible be-
cause it does not force any items to be generalized together,
as formally shown in Corollary 3.1. This is different from
the full-subtree generalization model [7] adopted in [20],
Figure 4: An example of set-based anonymization.
which forces all siblings of an original (leaf-level) item to
be mapped to an intermediate node in the hierarchy when
this item is generalized to the intermediate node.
Corollary 3.1. In the set-based anonymization model,
mapping an item ir ∈ I to a generalized item i˜ does not
force any other item is ∈ I to be mapped to i˜.
Additionally, as explained in Corollary 3.2, the set-based
anonymization model contains the generalization model
used in [20] as a special case. Thus, our model enables ex-
ploring a much larger set of possible anonymizations, which
have the potential to incur less information loss.
Corollary 3.2. The full-subtree recoding model is a
special case of the set-based anonymization model, where
each ˜im, m ∈ [1, M˜ ], is mapped to an intermediate node
of the considered hierarchy.
Our anonymization model transforms a dataset D into a
new dataset D˜ that helps prevent identity disclosure, since
the number of transactions of D˜ that can be associated with
an individual is increased, as proven in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. (Generalization Principle). Given
two items ir, is that appear in transactions of D and are
mapped to the same generalized item i˜ after anonymizing D
to D˜, and an itemset iris, it holds that
sup(˜i, D˜) = sup(ir,D) + sup(is,D) − sup(iris,D)
Proof. The proof follows directly from the fact that the
items ir and is, and the itemset iris are mapped to a com-
mon literal i˜ ∈ D˜ in all transactions of D that support ir, is
or iris.
We illustrate Theorem 3.1 using Figs. 1(a) and 2(c). Con-
sider items a, b and the itemset ab in Fig. 1(a), which have
support of 6, 3 and 2 respectively, and are mapped to the
same generalized item (a, b) in Fig. 2(c). Observe that (a, b)
has a support of 7 that is equal to the sum of the supports
of a, b minus that of ab.
3.2 Privacy Constraints
The integration of privacy constraints is central to our
framework because they allow for the explicit definition of
which itemsets are potentially linkable and require protec-
tion. In what follows, we formally define the notion of pri-
vacy constraints and their satisfiability.
Definition 3.2. (Privacy Constraint Set). A pri-
vacy constraint p is a non-empty set of items in I that are
specified as potentially linkable. The union of all privacy
constraints formulates a privacy constraint set P.
Definition 3.3. (Privacy Constraint Satisfiabil-
ity). Given a parameter k, a privacy constraint p =
{i1, ..., ir} ∈ P is satisfied when the corresponding itemset⋃r
m=1 Φ(im) is: (1) supported by at least k transactions in
D˜, or (2) not supported in D˜ and each of its proper subsets
is either supported by at least k transactions in D˜ or not
supported in D˜. P is satisfied when every p ∈ P is satisfied.
To illustrate these definitions, consider the privacy con-
straint p1 = {a, b, c} in Fig. 1(b). This privacy constraint
is satisfied for k = 5 in the dataset of Fig. 2(c) because 5
transactions support the itemset Φ(a)∪Φ(b)∪Φ(c) = (a, b)c.
Satisfying a privacy constraint p prevents identity disclo-
sure because the number of transactions that can be linked
to an individual using any subset of items in p is either at
least k, or zero, as shown in Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. (Monotonicity). For a given k, the
satisfaction of a privacy constraint p in D˜ implies that each
privacy constraint pj ⊂ p is satisfied in D˜.
Proof. Assume that a privacy constraint pj ⊂ p is not
satisfied in D˜ for this value of k. Then, according to Defi-
nition 3.3, the satisfaction of p implies that the itemset I =⋃
∀im∈p
Φ(im) is supported by either at least k or 0 trans-
actions in D˜. Now, consider an itemset J =
⋃
∀im∈pj
Φ(im),
which is derived by applying Φ on each item in pj . Since
J ⊂ I , we have sup(J, D˜) > sup(I, D˜) when sup(I, D˜) ≥ k
due to the monotonicity principle [1]. When sup(I, D˜) = 0,
pj is satisfied by Definition 3.3. In either case pj is satisfied
in D˜ for the given k, which contradicts the assumption and
proves that the theorem holds true.
Our privacy constraint specification model offers two ben-
efits. First, it allows data owners to specify a range of dif-
ferent privacy requirements. For instance, it can be used to
protect specific itemsets of various sizes, or to provide the
same privacy guarantees as km-anonymity (by formulating
a privacy constraint set that consists of all itemsets of size
m). Second, our model allows protecting any set of item-
sets without enforcing any additional itemsets to be unnec-
essarily protected. This is important because unecessarily
protecting itemsets may significantly increase the amount of
information loss incurred to anonymize data.
3.3 Utility Constraints
Privacy protection is offered at the expense of data util-
ity [8,19], and so it is important to ensure that anonymized
data is not overly distorted. Existing approaches attempt
to do so by minimizing the amount of information loss in-
curred when anonymizing transactions [5, 20], but do not
guarantee furnishing a useful result for intended applica-
tions. By contrast, our methodology offers such guaran-
tees through the introduction of utility constraints. Be-
fore formally defining such constraints, we make the fol-
lowing important observations related to data usefulness.
Observation 1 Mapping a set of items in D to the
same generalized item in the anonymized dataset D˜ in-
troduces distortion because these items become indistin-
guishable in D˜. When there is no control of how spe-
cific items are generalized, D˜ may not be practically useful.
Observation 2 Suppressing an item in D introduces distor-
tion because this item is not contained in D˜ and the amount
of distortion increases with the number of suppressions.
Based on these observations, we introduce a utility con-
straint set U to limit the amount of generalization items are
allowed to receive based on application requirements, and
bound the number of items that can be suppressed using a
threshold s. Definitions 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the definition
of a utility constraint set and its satisfiability respectively.
Definition 3.4. (Utility Constraint Set). A utility
constraint set U is a partition of I that declares the set of
allowable mappings of the items from I to those of I˜ through
Φ. Each element of U is called a utility constraint.
Definition 3.5. (Utility Constraint Set Satisfia-
bility). Given sets I, I˜, a utility constraint set U, and a
parameter s, U is satisfied if and only if (1) for each non-
empty ˜im ∈ I˜, ∃uj ∈ U such that ˜im ⊆ uj , and (2) the frac-
tion of items in I contained in the set of suppressed items
S is at most s%.
The first condition limits the maximum amount of gen-
eralization each item is allowed to receive in a set-based
anonymization I˜, while the second condition ensures that
the number of suppressed items is controlled by a threshold
specified by data owners. When both of these conditions
hold, U is satisfied, and I˜ corresponds to a dataset that can
be meaningfully analyzed. Example 2 illustrates the above
definitions.
Example 2. Consider Fig. 5, in which i˜1 ⊆ u1, i˜2 ⊆ u2,
and i˜4, i˜5, i˜6 are subsets of u4. The percent of suppressed
items is 12.5% because I consists of 8 items (see Fig. 4),
and only d is suppressed. Thus, U is satisfied.
Figure 5: Utility Constraint Set Satisfiability exam-
ple for the set-based anonymization of Fig. 4
We also observe that the number of the supporting trans-
actions of a generalized item in the anonymized dataset D˜
is equal to the number of transactions supporting any item
in the original dataset D that is mapped to this generalized
item, as illustrated in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3. Given a generalized item ˜im ∈ I˜ such that
˜im = {i1, ..., ir}, it holds that
|D˜ ˜im | = |Di1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dir |
where |D˜ ˜im | denotes the size of the set of supporting trans-
actions of ˜im in D˜, and |Di1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dir | the size of the
set of transactions supporting at least one of the items in
{i1, ..., ir} in D.
Proof. The proof is omitted, because it is similar to that
of Theorem 3.1.
Based on Theorem 3.3, we provide the following corollary
that highlights the importance of anonymizing data while
satisfying utility constraints.
Corollary 3.3. Given a utility constraint set U that is
satisfied, a utility constraint uj = {i1, ..., ir} ∈ U, and a set
of generalized items {i˜1, ..., i˜s} constructed by mapping each
element of uj to one of these items, it holds that
|D˜i˜1 ∪ . . . ∪ D˜i˜s | = |Di1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dir |
Thus, the number of transactions of D supporting any
item contained in a utility constraint uj ∈ U can be accu-
rately computed from the anonymized dataset D˜, when U
is satisfied and all items in uj have been generalized. This
is crucial in many data analysis tasks (e.g., in generalized
association rule mining [17]) where the support of itemsets
corresponding to aggregate concepts (i.e., itemsets with a
more general meaning than the items they are comprised
of) needs to be determined, as illustrated below.
Example 3. Consider that the dataset of Fig. 1(a) has
to be anonymized to support a study in which the number of
patients diagnosed with diabetes needs to be accurately com-
puted. Assume also that diagnosis codes a and b correspond
to two different forms of diabetes. Observe that the number
of patients suffering from diabetes (i.e., transactions having
a, b or ab) in the dataset of Fig. 1(a) is the same as in the
anonymization of this dataset shown in Fig. 2(c), because
this anonymization satisfies the utility constraints of Fig.
1(c) and both a and b in u1 = {a, b} have been generalized.
3.4 Information Loss
There may be many anonymizations that satisfy the pri-
vacy and utility constraint sets, but they may not be equally
useful. Since discovering the one that least harms data util-
ity is important, we propose a measure to capture data util-
ity based on information loss.
Definition 3.6. (Utility Loss for a Generalized
Item). The Utility Loss (UL) for a generalized item ˜im is
defined as
UL( ˜im) =
2|
˜im| − 1
2M − 1
× w( ˜im)×
sup(i˜m, D˜)
N
where | ˜im| denotes the number of items from I mapped to ˜im
using Φ, and w : I˜ → [0, 1] is a function assigning a weight
to ˜im.
UL measures the amount of information loss caused by
generalizing a set of items as a product of three terms. The
first term penalizes a generalized item based on the number
of items from I mapped to it. This is because a generalized
item can be interpreted as any of the 2|
˜im| − 1 non-empty
subsets of the set of items mapped to it [5], and there are
2M − 1 possible non-empty subsets that can be formed us-
ing items from I. The second term is a weight specified
by data owners to quantify the harm to data utility caused
by a generalized item, according to the items mapped to it.
Weights need to be between 0 and 1 for normalization pur-
poses, where larger weights are assigned to generalized items
comprised of items that are more semantically distant, since
such generalized items harm data utility more [20]. The se-
mantic distance of items can be computed in many ways
(e.g., based on the height of a hierarchy [16], the number of
leaves of the closest common ascendant of these items in a
hierarchy [24], with the aid of ontologies [22], or by expert
knowledge). The third term is the support of a generalized
item in the anonymized dataset, normalized by the number
of transactions. Items that appear often in the anonymized
dataset are penalized more, since they introduce more data
distortion. Example 4 illustrates how UL can be computed.
Example 4. Consider Fig. 1(a), and the anonymized
dataset of Fig. 2(c). Items a and b are generalized to (a, b),
which is assigned a weight of 0.375 specified by the data
owner, and has a support of 7 in Fig. 2(c). The UL for
(a, b) is computed as 2
2−1
28−1
× 0.375 × 7
8
≈ 0.004.
Based on Definition 3.6, we quantify the total amount of
information loss for an anonymized dataset D˜ as follows.
Definition 3.7. (Utility Loss for an Anonymized
Dataset). The Utility Loss for an anonymized dataset D˜ is
given by
UL(D˜) =
∑
∀ ˜im 6=∅
UL( ˜im) +
∑
∀im∈S
Y (im)
where Y : I → ℜ is a function assigning a penalty to each
suppressed item im from D.
The above definition captures data utility loss caused by
both generalization and suppression. Specifically, for sup-
pression, similar to [25], we allow data owners to assign a
penalty to each suppressed item, according to the perceived
importance of retaining this item in the anonymized result.
For instance, each suppressed item could receive a penalty
equal to its support, based on the fact that this defines the
number of transactions from which it is eliminated.
3.5 Problem Statement
Given a transactional dataset D, a privacy constraint set P,
a utility constraint set U, and parameters k, s, construct an
anonymized version D˜ of D using the set-based anonymiza-
tion model such that: (1) P and U are both satisfied, and
(2) the amount of utility loss UL(D˜) is minimal.
4. ANONYMIZATION ALGORITHM
We now present COAT (COnstraint-based Anonymiza-
tion of Transactions), a heuristic algorithm that solves the
aforementioned problem using item generalization and sup-
pression. Given D,P ,U , k and s, COAT selects a privacy
constraint p ∈ P , and applies item generalizations that are
specified by U and incur the smallest amount of information
loss to satisfy p. When p cannot be satisfied by generaliza-
tion, COAT suppresses the minimum number of items in p to
satisfy it. The process is repeated for all privacy constraints
until P is satisfied.
Pseudocode for COAT is provided in Algorithm 1. Since
the anonymized dataset D˜ is produced by transforming
items in transactions of the original dataset D, in step 1,
we initialize D˜ to D. Steps 2 to 14 present the main itera-
tion of COAT, which aims to satisfy the privacy constraint
set P (step 2). In step 3, COAT selects the privacy con-
straint p that is not satisfied and corresponds to an itemset
Algorithm 1 COAT(D,P,U , k, s)
1. D˜ ← D
2. while P is not satisfied do
3. find p corresponding to I s.t.
I ← arg max
∀pj∈P:pjis not satisfied
(
sup(∪(ir∈pj)ir, D˜)
)
4. while p is not satisfied ∧ |I| > 1 do
5. im ← argmin
∀ir∈I
sup(ir , D˜)
6. ul ← {uj ∈ U | im ∈ uj}
7. if |ul| > 1
8. Generalize(im, ul,P)
9. else if sup(im, D˜) < k
10. Suppress(im, ul,P, s)
11. if p is not satisfied ∧ |I| = 1
12. while p is not satisfied do
13. im ← argmin
∀ir∈I
sup(ir , D˜)
14. Suppress(im, ul,P, s)
15. return D˜
I having maximum support in D˜, since satisfying this con-
straint incurs minimal distortion of D. This is due to the
fact that the minimum number of transactions in D˜ have to
be distorted to augment the support of I to at least k.
Next, while p remains unsatisfied in D˜ and p contains more
than one generalized item (step 4), COAT performs steps 5
to 10. In step 5, the item im from p with the minimum
support in D˜ is selected to be generalized. Selecting im
this way attempts to minimize the number of generalizations
required to satisfy p, as items with “low” support need to
be generalized to meet the specified k. Subsequently, we
identify the utility constraint ul from U for which im ∈ ul, in
order to retrieve the items that are allowed to be generalized
with im (step 6). If at least one item apart from im is
contained in ul (step 7), item im is generalized in a way
that minimizes information loss (step 8) as illustrated in
Algorithm 2. Otherwise we suppress im through a function
Suppress, given in Algorithm 3, since applying generalization
to increase the support of im to k would result in violating
ul (steps 9− 10).
Steps 11 to 14 aim to satisfy p by suppressing the min-
imum number of items in D˜ required to satisfy this con-
straint. When I consists of one (generalized) item only, and
p is not satisfied (step 11), we iteratively suppress items in
I , starting with the one having the minimum support, until
p is met (steps 12− 14). Last, D˜ is released (step 15).
Algorithm 2 Generalize(im, ul,P)
1. is ← argmin
∀ir∈ul\{im}
UL( (im, ir) )
2. i˜← (im, is)
3. foreach p ∈ P : im ∈ p ∨ is ∈ p
4. p← (p ∪ {˜i})\{im, is}
5. ul ← (ul ∪ {˜i})\{im, is}
6. Update transactions of D˜ based on i˜
Algorithm 3 Suppress(im , ul,P, s)
1. ul ← ul\{im}
2. foreach p ∈ P : im ∈ p
3. p← p\{im}
4. Remove im from all transactions of D˜
5. if more than s% of items are suppressed
6. Error: U is violated
Algorithms 2 and 3 indicate how COAT performs gener-
alization and suppression respectively. Each of these oper-
ations involves updating the privacy and utility constraint
sets P and U , as well as selected transactions of D˜.
Specifically, Generalize (Algorithm 2) operates as follows.
In step 1, it identifies the item is that can be generalized
together with im in a way that incurs the least possible in-
formation loss according to theULmeasure. Step 2 performs
the mapping of the two items to a common generalized item
i˜. Following that, steps 3 − 5 update the privacy and the
utility constraints to reflect this generalization. Finally, the
transactions of D˜ that supported any of im, is are updated
to support the generalized item i˜ instead.
Suppress (Algorithm 3) involves removing an item im from
the privacy and utility constraint sets (steps 1− 3), and the
transactions supporting it in D˜ (step 4). Finally, it checks
whether the imposed suppression threshold s has been sur-
passed (step 5). This happens when utility constraints are
overly restrictive (e.g., they require all items to remain in-
tact in the anonymized dataset) and a “low” suppression
threshold is used. In this case, data owners are notified
that the utility constraint set U has been violated and the
anonymization process terminates (step 6).
Example 5. We apply COAT on the dataset D of Fig.
1(a), using the constraints of Figs. 1(b) and 1(c), k = 5, and
s = 15%. Since P contains p1, p2 whose itemsets are equally
supported in D, COAT arbitrarily considers p1 = {a, b, c}.
Then, it selects b, which has the minimum support among
a, b and c, and generalizes it together with a, as required by
u1. This increases the support of (a, b)c to 7, satisfying p1.
Subsequently, COAT considers p2 = {d, e, f, g, h}. Item d is
minimally supported among the items of p2, thus it is con-
sidered for generalization. However, d cannot be generalized
due to u3, and it is suppressed, since its support is below k.
After suppressing d, p2 is still not met. Since in p2, both
g, h have minimum support, g is arbitrarily selected to be
generalized. Item g can be generalized with any of e, f or h,
but it is generalized with h, since (g, h) incurs the minimum
information loss. This satisfies p2 and P is now satisfied. U
is also satisfied as shown in Example 2.
5. SPECIFYING PRIVACY AND UTILITY
CONSTRAINTS
The notions of privacy and utility constraints, which re-
flect itemsets deemed as potentially linkable and important
for intended data analysis tasks respectively, are central to
our anonymization approach. Our constraint specification
framework allows data owners to formulate detailed con-
straints based on their specific privacy and utility require-
ments, which are given as input to COAT. However, ac-
knowledging that constraint specification may be challeng-
ing for data owners who lack domain knowledge, we present
simple methods that aim to help such data owners formulate
constraints.
Section 5.1 discusses our Privacy constraint set generation
(Pgen) algorithm that constructs a privacy constraint set
automatically, assuming that attackers can use any part of
any transaction to link published data to individuals. Pgen
works by searching the original dataset for itemsets with
“low” support, each of which is treated as potentially link-
able and is modeled as a privacy constraint. Although the
resultant privacy constraint set corresponds to a stringent
privacy policy, we believe that adopting this policy is a safe
choice when data owners are unable to specify which items
are potentially linkable. Section 5.2 provides a recipe to
reduce the effort of specifying utility constraints.
5.1 Constructing a Privacy Constraint Set
Before presenting Pgen, we capture the largest part of a
transaction that can be used in linking attacks using Defi-
nition 5.1.
Definition 5.1. (Maximal Infrequent Itemsets).
Given a transactional dataset D, and a parameter k, we de-
fine the set of maximal infrequent itemsets in D as those
itemsets that have a support in the interval (0, k) in D, and
none of their proper supersets is supported in D.
Example 6 illustrates the above definition.
Example 6. Consider a dataset comprised of the last
three transactions of the dataset of Fig. 1(a) (associated
with the itemsets {a, c, f}, {a, c} and {b, h} respectively),
and that k is set to 2. The lattice of itemsets in this dataset
is illustrated in Fig. 6, in which the support of each sup-
ported itemset is shown next to it. As can be seen, the set of
maximal infrequent itemsets in this dataset contains only
acf and bh, as each of these itemsets is supported in the
dataset and all of its proper supersets have a support of zero.
Figure 6: An example of maximal infrequent item-
sets
Given a transactional dataset D, and a parameter k, Pgen
constructs a privacy constraint set P that contains all the
maximal infrequent itemsets in D. As mentioned above, the
generated P can be given as input to COAT to ensure that
anonymized data can prevent linking attacks based on any
part of any transaction in D. The pseudocode of Pgen is
provided in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Pgen(D, k)
1. P ← sorted transactions of D with respect to their size
in decreasing order
2. foreach Tr ∈ P, r = 1, ...,N
3. foreach Ts ∈ P, s = (r + 1), ...,N
4. if Ts ⊆ Tr
Remove Ts from P
5. Itemset I ← Tr
6. if sup(I,D) ≥ k
7. Remove Tr from P
8. return P
Pgen starts by creating a privacy constraint set P , which
is initialized by the set of transactions of the original dataset
D, each of which is treated as a privacy constraint. Clearly,
this set may contain redundant itemsets, which would result
in an unnecessary computational overhead if used as input
to COAT. This is because COAT works by satisfying each
privacy constraint iteratively. Therefore, Pgen implements
a simple pruning strategy that removes redundant privacy
constraints from P to reduce its size without affecting the
privacy guarantees provided when P is satisfied.
The first step of this strategy is to populate P with the
set of transactions of D, sorted in terms of decreasing size.
Subsequently, in steps 2-4, transactions (Ts) that are subsets
of other transactions (Tr) are identified and removed from
P . This is because these transactions cannot correspond
to maximal infrequent itemsets, according to Definition 5.1.
Next, steps 6 and 7 ensure that privacy constraints that do
not require protection (i.e. itemsets induced by transactions
having a support of at least k in D) are not included in P .
Finally, P , which contains the set of maximal infrequent
itemsets in D, is returned in step 8. This privacy constraint
set can be given as input to COAT. Notice that Pgen has a
quadratic run-time complexity, as it involves sorting, pair-
wise comparison, and support computation for transactions.
To illustrate how Pgen works, we provide Example 7.
Example 7. Consider applying Pgen on the dataset of
Example 6, using k = 2. This results in initializing P
with three privacy constraints p1 = {a, c, f}, p2 = {a, c} and
p3 = {b, h} (one for each transaction), which are sorted in
terms of decreasing size. Subsequently, p2 is removed from
P, because {a, c} is a subset of p1 = {a, c, f}. Next, Pgen
checks the support of p1, and so retains it in P as the sup-
port of p1 in this dataset is 1 ∈ (0, 2). In the final iteration,
Pgen examines p3, and retains it in P for the same reason.
Thus, Pgen returns P = {p1, p3}.
5.2 Formulating a Utility Constraint Set
While privacy constraints can be extracted automatically
as discussed above, this is difficult for utility constraints, be-
cause they model application-specific data analysis require-
ments. Thus, we assume that data owners are able to specify
utility constraints to avoid distorting itemsets that need to
be used in intended applications.
When interested in generating anonymized data that al-
lows the counts of aggregate concepts to be accurately deter-
mined, for example, data users can formulate a utility con-
straint for each of these concepts (itemsets), as explained in
Section 3.3. These itemsets may be selected with the help
of hierarchies or ontologies, which are specified by domain
experts or constructed in an automated fashion [14]. A util-
ity constraint containing the remaining items (i.e., those not
contained in the selected itemsets) should also be specified
to ensure that the utility constraint set is a partition of I
(see Definition 3.4).
We emphasize that the way all items are generalized is
governed by the utility loss function (see Definition 3.6),
which forces semantically related items to be generalized
together. Example 8 illustrates how utility constraints may
be specified.
Example 8. Consider that the dataset of Fig. 1(a) has
to be anonymized to support the study of Example 3 in which
the number of patients diagnosed with diabetes (i.e., trans-
actions having a, b, or ab) needs to be accurately computed.
To support this study, the hospital can specify a utility con-
straint {a, b}, and include all the remaining diagnosis codes
in a second constraint {c, d, e, f, g, h}.
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we compare COAT to Apriori [20] using
four series of experiments. In the first series, we compare the
amount of information loss the algorithms incur to achieve
km-anonymity. The second and third series of experiments
examine whether the algorithms can meet detailed privacy
and utility requirements without harming data utility, and
the last series evaluate their efficiency.
6.1 Experimental setup and metrics
We use two real-world transactional datasets, BMS-
WebView-1 (BMS1 ) and BMS-WebView-2 (BMS2 ), which
contain click-stream data from two e-commerce sites. The
datasets have been used in evaluating prior work [5,20] and
also as benchmarks in the 2000 KDD-Cup competition. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes their characteristics.
Dataset N |I| Max. |T | Avg. |T |
BMS-1 59602 497 267 2.5
BMS-2 77512 3340 161 5.0
Table 1: Description of used datasets
To ensure a fair comparison between COAT and Apriori,
we configured the latter with the same hierarchies as in [20]
and set the weights w( ˜im) used in COAT based on a notion
of semantic distance computed according to the aforemen-
tioned hierarchies [24]. We did not compare our approach to
the two other algorithms proposed by the authors of Apriori
in [20]. This is because these algorithms have been shown
to be comparable to Apriori in terms of effectiveness, while
they are only applicable to datasets with a small domain of
less than 50 items [20] (typically, transactional datasets have
a domain size in the order of hundreds or thousands). We
also did not compare our approach to those of [25] and [5],
since these approaches require a fixed categorization of items
into potentially linkable and sensitive, a classification that
is not applicable to the problem we tackle.
Both COAT and Apriori were implemented in C++. All
experiments were performed on an Intel 2.8GHz machine
equipped with 4GB of RAM.
To quantify information loss, we considered aggregate
query answering as an indicative application, and mea-
sured the accuracy of answering workloads of queries on
anonymized data produced by the tested algorithms. This
is a widely-used approach to characterize information loss
[5,9,23] and is invariant of the way tested algorithms work.
Consider the COUNT() query Q shown in Fig. 7. We obtain
an accurate answer a(Q) for Q when this query is applied
to original data D, but not in the case of generalized data
D˜, as original items from I are mapped to generalized ones
in I˜. Therefore, we can only estimate the answer for Q.
Q: SELECT COUNT(Tn (or T˜n ))
FROM D (or D˜)
WHERE i1 ∈ Tn ∧ i2 ∈ Tn ∧ . . . ∧ iq ∈ Tn
(or Φ(i1) ∈ T˜n ∧ ... ∧Φ(iq) ∈ T˜n)
Figure 7: COUNT() query example
This estimation can be performed by computing the prob-
ability a transaction of D˜ satisfies Q, as Πqr=1p(ir), where
p(ir) is the probability of mapping an item ir, r = 1, ..., q,
in the query to a generalized item ˜im, assuming that ˜im can
include any possible subset of the items mapped to it with
equal probability, and that there are no correlations among
generalized items [5, 9, 23]. An estimated answer e(Q) of Q
is then derived by summing the corresponding probabilities
across all transactions T˜n of D˜.
To measure the accuracy of estimating Q, we use the Rel-
ative Error (RE ) measure computed as RE (Q)= |a(Q) −
e(Q)|/a(Q). Given a workload of queries, the Average
Relative Error (AvgRE ) for all queries, reflects how well
anonymized data supports query answering [9,23]. To mea-
sure AvgRE, we constructed workloads comprised of 1000
COUNT() queries similar to Q. The items participating in
these queries were selected randomly from the generalized
items.
6.2 Achieving km-anonymity
In this section, we empirically confirm that COAT not
only satisfies km-anonymity, but does so with up to 9 times
less information loss than Apriori. Specifically, we ran
COAT by including all m-itemsets in the privacy constraint
set P , considering a utility constraint set U that contains all
items (effectively allowing all possible generalizations), and
setting s = 0.5%. Both algorithms used the same k and m
values. The results with respect to AvgRE and ULmeasures
are summarized in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 respectively. In
these experiments COAT did not suppress any items.
6.2.1 Capturing data utility using AvgRE
Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) report AvgRE scores for BMS1, where
the number of items q included in a query was 1 and 3 re-
spectively, m was set to 2, and k was selected over the range
[2, 50]. As expected, increasing k induced more information
loss due to the utility/privacy trade-off. Increasing q had a
similar effect because accurately answering queries involving
many items is more difficult. COAT outperformed Apriori
in both cases, achieving up to 9 times better AvgRE scores.
This is because, as k increases, the recoding model of Apriori
forces an increasingly large number of items to be general-
ized together, while the model in COAT generalizes no more
items than required to protect an itemset. Similar results
were achieved for BMS2 (omitted for brevity).
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Figure 8: AvgRE vs. k for (a) q = 1 and (b) q = 3 in
BMS1
We also executed COAT and Apriori using k = 5, and
varied m between 1 and 3. The AvgRE scores for BMS1
are shown in Fig. 9(a). Apriori incurred 7 times more infor-
mation loss than COAT to anonymize BMS1 when m = 3.
This is because the number of items that Apriori forces to
be generalized together to protect m-itemsets increases sub-
stantially as m grows. The impact of this generalization
strategy on data utility was even more evident in the case
of BMS2, as shown in Fig. 9(b).
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Figure 9: AvgRE vs. m for (a) BMS1 and (b) BMS2
6.2.2 Capturing data utility using UL
We compared the two algorithms with respect to the UL
measure. Fig. 10(a) shows the result of running these al-
gorithms on BMS2 using m = 2 and k values between 2
and 50. Observe that Apriori was fairly insensitive to k up
to 25. In fact, Apriori over-generalized itemsets by increas-
ing their support to much larger values than k due to its
recoding strategy. On the other hand, COAT achieved a
much better result for all tested k values, due to the fine-
grained generalization model it employs. We also exam-
ined how the algorithms fared with respect to UL when m
varies between 1 and 3, and k = 5. Observe that Apri-
ori incurred substantially more information loss than COAT
for all tested m values. This again suggests that the gen-
eralization scheme of Apriori distorts data much more than
our set-based anonymization strategy. Similar results were
obtained for BMS1 (omitted for brevity).
We do not report additional results with respect to UL
because COAT is designed to optimize this measure, and
thus outperformed Apriori in all tested cases.
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Figure 10: (a) UL vs. k and (b) UL vs. m for BMS2
6.3 Privacy constraints vs. data utility
In this section, we experimentally confirm that our ap-
proach can generate anonymizations with a high level of
data utility through the specification of detailed privacy con-
straints by data owners. The impact of constraints gener-
ated by Pgen on data utility will be examined in Section
7. We constructed two types of privacy policies to simulate
different privacy requirements, one in which itemsets that
require protection are all of the same size and comprised of
certain items from I, and another in which such itemsets
differ in size. The utility constraint set U used in COAT
was set as in Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Protecting itemsets comprised of certain items
We considered 5 privacy policies of the first type, PP1,. . . ,
PP5, each of which assumes that all 2-itemsets containing a
certain percent of randomly selected items require protection
with k = 5. The mappings between privacy policies and the
percent of such items are as follows: PP1→ 2%, PP2→ 5%,
PP3→ 10%, PP4→ 25%, PP5→ 50%. These policies are
taken into account by COAT, but not by Apriori, which
needs to protect all 2-itemsets to satisfy them.
We first studied how privacy policies affect data utility,
as captured by AvgRE. Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) illustrate the
results for q = 1 and q = 3 respectively. As expected, be-
cause it avoids unnecessarily protecting itemsets that are
not specified by these policies, COAT distorted data signif-
icantly less than Apriori. This is supported by the AvgRE
scores for COAT which were significantly better than Apri-
ori. Furthermore, as policies become more strict (i.e., require
protecting itemsets induced by a larger percent of items from
I), the AvgRE scores for COAT became slightly worse due
to the utility/privacy traded-off. Nevertheless, these scores
remain substantially better than that of Apriori in all cases.
We repeated the same experiments for BMS2, and obtained
similar results shown in Figs. 11(c) and 11(d) respectively.
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Figure 11: AvgRE vs. Privacy Policy (a) for q = 1
and (b) for q = 3 (in BMS1), and (c) for q = 1 and
(d) for q = 3 (in BMS2)
6.3.2 Protecting itemsets of varying size
We simulated 4 privacy policies of the second type: PP6,
. . . , PP9. In each of these policies, P consisted of itemsets
with size 1 to 4, as shown in Table 2, and k = 5. To ac-
count for these policies, Apriori had to protect all possible
4-itemsets, and thus it was configured with m = 4.
Privacy % of % of % of % of
Policy items 2-itemsets 3-itemsets 4-itemsets
PP6 33% 33% 33% 1%
PP7 30% 30% 30% 10%
PP8 25% 25% 25% 25%
PP9 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 50%
Table 2: Summary of privacy policies PP6, . . . , PP9
The AvgRE scores for BMS1 and BMS2, and a workload
comprised of queries with q = 2 are depicted in Figs. 12(a)
and 12(b) respectively. Notice that COAT achieved bet-
ter AvgRE scores in both datasets, permitting answers to
queries up to 40 times more accurately than Apriori. This
is because COAT applies generalization to each privacy con-
straint separately, thereby applying the minimum level of
generalization required to satisfy the specified constraint.
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Figure 12: AvgRE vs. Privacy Policy for q = 2 (a)
in BMS1 and (b) in BMS2
6.4 Utility constraints vs. data utility
The experiments reported in this section examine the ef-
fect of utility constraints on data utility. We assumed 4
utility policies: UP1, . . . , UP4. Each policy contains groups
of a certain number of semantically close items (i.e., sibling
items in the hierarchy). The mappings between utility poli-
cies and the size of these groups are as follows: UP1→ 25,
UP2→ 50, UP3→ 250, and UP4→ 500. Items in each group
are allowed to be generalized together. Note that UP1 and
UP2, which have smaller group sizes, are very stringent and
may require suppression to be satisfied. For this reason, we
configured COAT with a small suppression threshold s of
0.5%. Apriori does not address these policies because item
generalization is not guided by utility constraints. Also, the
privacy constraint set P included all 2-itemsets and Apriori
was run with m = 2.
AvgRE scores for a workload of queries with q = 1 and
q = 3, are shown in Figs. 13(a) and 13(b) respectively,
for BMS1. Observe that COAT significantly outperformed
Apriori for all utility policies. Furthermore, the number
of suppressed items was very small (0.01%) and occurred
only in the case of UP1. This illustrates the effectiveness
of COAT, which suppresses the minimum number of items
required, and only when utility constraints cannot be other-
wise met. We also note that COAT was able to satisfy the
imposed utility policies in all cases, unlike Apriori which was
unable to meet any of them. Interestingly, the AvgRE scores
for COAT were not substantially affected by utility policies.
This is because COAT applied a much lower level of general-
ization than that specified by the utility constraints. Similar
trends were observed for BMS2 (omitted for brevity).
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Figure 13: AvgRE vs. Utility Policy (a) for q = 1
and (b) for q = 3 (in BMS1)
6.5 Efficiency of Computation
We compared COAT and Apriori in terms of efficiency.
We first examined the scalability of these algorithms with re-
spect to dataset cardinality, by applying them on a dataset
constructed by randomly selecting transactions of BMS1.
COAT was configured by setting P and U as in Section
6.2, m = 2 and k = 5. Apriori was run with the same k
and m values. Fig. 14(a) reports run-time as cardinality
varies from 1K to 50K transactions. COAT scales better
than Apriori with the size of the dataset; up to 2.5 times
faster. This is because COAT prunes the space by discarding
protected itemsets as cardinality increases, whereas Apriori
considers all m-itemsets as well their possible generaliza-
tions.
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Figure 14: Efficiency vs. (a) dataset size |D| and (b)
k
Last, we evaluated the impact of k on the run-time of
COAT and Apriori on BMS1. We used k values between 2
and 50, and set up all other parameters as in the previous
experiment. As can be seen in Fig. 14(b), COAT is slightly
less efficient than Apriori. This is due to the fact that COAT
generalizes one item at a time, exploiting the flexibility of
the set-based anonymization model. By comparison, Apri-
ori generalizes entire subtrees of items and thus reaches the
specified k faster. Nevertheless, the computation cost of
COAT was less than half a minute, remaining sub-linear for
all testes values of k.
7. CASE STUDY: DIAGNOSIS CODES
In this section, we examine whether COAT can produce
anonymized data that permits accurate analysis in a real-
world scenario involving detailed, application-specific util-
ity requirements. In this context, a transactional dataset
(referred to as EMR) derived from the Electronic Medical
Record system of the Vanderbilt University Medical Cen-
ter [18] needs to be published to enable certain biomedical
studies. Each transaction of EMR corresponds to a distinct
patient, and contains his/her diagnosis codes in the form of
ICD-9 codes 1. Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of
EMR.
Dataset N |I| Max. |T | Avg. |T |
EMR 1336 5830 25 3.1
Table 3: Description of the EMR dataset.
The studies that anonymized data needs to support focus
on 20 different disorders, each of which is modeled as a set of
ICD-9 codes. For instance, pancreatic cancer is represented
as a set of 7 ICD-9 codes, which correspond to different
1ICD-9 is the official system of assigning codes to diagnoses
in the U.S.
forms of pancreatic cancer and indicate that a patient suffers
from this disorder. To support these studies, the number
of patients suffering from each of these disorders needs to
be accurately computed. At the same time, the linkage of
transactions to patients’ identities based on any combination
of ICD-9 codes must be prevented, because the vast majority
of ICD-9 codes contained in EMR can be found in other
sources, as verified in our previous study [10].
To achieve both privacy and utility, we used our Pgen
algorithm to construct a privacy constraint set, and formu-
lated a utility constraint set comprised of 20 utility con-
straints, each for a different disorder (e.g., we specified a
utility constraint that contains the 7 ICD-9 codes corre-
sponding to pancreatic cancer). Furthermore, we configured
COAT by setting the weights w( ˜im) used in it based on a
notion of semantic similarity [24] computed according to the
hierarchy for ICD-9 codes 2, and limited the maximum al-
lowable fraction of suppressed items by setting s to 0.5%.
Apriori was also applied to anonymize EMR, although it
provides no guarantees that utility constraints are satisfied.
We evaluated the utility of anonymizations produced by
both COAT and Apriori in two ways. First, we examined
whether the produced anonymizations satisfied the specified
utility constraint set. In fact, anonymizations constructed
by COAT satisfy the latter set for all tested k values (namely
2, 5, 10, 25 and 50). Thus, COAT managed to generate prac-
tically useful anonymizations that allow the number of pa-
tients having any of the 20 disorders used in the intended
studies to be accurately computed (see Corollary 3.3). On
the other hand, the anonymizations constructed by the Apri-
ori algorithm did not satisfy the specified utility constraint
set for any of the tested k values. Therefore, we did not eval-
uate the data utility of anonymizations produced by Apriori
using other criteria.
In addition to satisfying the specified utility constraints, it
is also important to generate anonymized data with“low” in-
formation loss that can support general data analysis tasks.
Therefore, we investigated whether our method can generate
anonymizations that are useful in aggregate query answer-
ing. To capture the amount of information loss, we used
the AvgRE measure, discussed in Section 6.1. AvgRE was
computed using two different workloads referred to as W1
and W2 respectively. W1 is comprised of COUNT() queries
that retrieve combinations of ICD-9 codes supported by at
least 10% of the transactions of EMR. These combinations
correspond to frequently co-occurring disorders (e.g., dia-
betes and hypertension) that are important in the context
of biomedical data analysis, and are different from the 20 dis-
orders contained in the utility constraint set. W2 is similar
to the workload considered in Section 6.1. It is comprised of
1000 COUNT() queries similar to the query shown in Fig.
7, each of which is comprised of 2 ICD-9 codes randomly
selected among generalized items. This workload models a
scenario involving anonymized data queried by users with
various data analysis requirements.
Fig. 15(a) reports the AvgRE scores for EMR, where k
was selected over the range [2, 50], and W1 was used. As
can be seen, the AvgRE scores indicate that anonymized
data permits queries that are common in biomedical data
analysis tasks to be answered fairly accurately, even when
a strict privacy policy is adopted. The corresponding result
2http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd9cm.htm
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Figure 15: AvgRE vs. k for EMR-D computed using
(a) W1 and (b) W2
for W2 is reported in Fig. 15(b). Again, the AvgRE scores
confirm that a low level of information loss was incurred to
anonymize EMR, particularly when k is 5 or lower as it is
commonly the case when publishing biomedical data [3].
In summary, our case study confirms the effectiveness of
our anonymization framework when there are specific utility
requirements. This is because it allows the EMR dataset to
be published in a way that prevents linking attacks with
respect to any portion of any transaction of this dataset,
helps biomedical studies focusing on specific disorders, and
allows accurate data analysis.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Existing approaches for anonymizing transactional data
often produce excessively distorted data that is of limited
utility, due to the fact that they incorporate coarse pri-
vacy requirements, are agnostic with respect to data utility
requirements, and search a fraction of the solution space.
In response, we developed a novel approach that overcomes
these limitations by allowing fine-grained privacy and util-
ity requirements to be specified as constraints, and COAT
(COnstraint-based Anonymization of Transactions), an al-
gorithm that transforms data using item generalization and
suppression to satisfy the specified constraints, while mini-
mally distorting data. We also demonstrated the effective-
ness of our approach using extensive experiments on bench-
mark datasets and a case study on patient-specific data
containing diagnosis codes. Our results demonstrate that
COAT is able to satisfy a wide range of privacy and utility
requirements with less information loss than the state-of-the
art method, and to anonymize data in a way that prevents
identity disclosure and retains data utility for intended ap-
plications.
This work also opens up several directions for future inves-
tigation. First, although experimentally shown to be both
effective and efficient in practice, the COAT algorithm is
heuristic in nature, and, as such, it does not guarantee gen-
erating optimal anonymizations in terms of minimum infor-
mation loss. To address the growing size of datasets and do-
mains, we intend to develop approximation algorithms that
can offer such guarantees. Second, we aim at extending our
framework to deal with the problem of attribute disclosure
based on the l-diversity privacy principle [11].
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